Avodah Zarah 66b — the Talmud in English

And Abaye understood:

“Its smell is vinegar and its taste is wine—vinegar.”

[Wine whose smell is like vinegar, even though its taste is like wine, is judged as vinegar].

And

therefore,

it becomes

like a mixture of

“a kind with its own kind,” and every “kind with its own kind”

forbids

even in the smallest amount.

And

Rava,

who

said that it is according to imparting taste,

understood:

“Its smell is vinegar and its taste is wine—wine”

[Wine whose smell is like vinegar, since its taste is like wine, is judged as wine],

and

therefore

it becomes

like a mixture of

“a kind with a different kind,” and every “kind with a different kind”

forbids only

by imparting

taste.

Abaye and Rava also disagreed:

“This bat teiha,”

[a hole made in the stopper of the barrel, into which they place a thin reed, and through it smell the wine, to test whether it can endure],

a gentile in the wine of an Israelite—it is entirely permissible.

That is, it is certainly permitted for a gentile to smell the wine of an Israelite, and the wine is not forbidden on account of the gentile’s smelling it.

But

an Israelite

who smells

the

wine

of a gentile: Abaye said: It is forbidden. Rava said: It is permitted.

And the root of their disagreement is:

Abaye,

who

said that it is forbidden,

understood:

“Smell is a substantive matter.”

That is, there is tangible substance in smell. And therefore it is forbidden to smell yayin nesekh.

But

Rava,

who

said that it is permitted,

understood:

“Smell is not a substantive matter.”

And therefore there is no prohibition against smelling yayin nesekh.

Rava said: From where do I say this

[What is the source for my words]

that smell is nothing at all?

For we learned

(Terumot, chapter 10, Mishna 4):

“An oven that they heated with cumin

[a type of plant whose seeds are used as a spice for stew]

of teruma, and he baked bread in it, the bread is permitted

for consumption by non-kohanim

since there is no taste of cumin

in the bread

, but the smell is the smell of cumin.”

And it is demonstrated that “smell is not a substantive matter.” And one may not be forbidden to derive benefit from the smell of a forbidden substance.

And Abaye

will explain the Mishna according to his position, and say:

“There it is different, for its prohibition is burned.”

That is, since the “cumin” was burned and is no longer present, the bread may not be forbidden on account of its smell.

Rav Mari said:

Apparently, the disagreement between Abaye and Rava is

a

disagreement

of tannaim,

for we likewise learned (Terumot there, Mishna 3):

“One who removes

[takes out from the oven]

hot bread

of non-teruma produce

, and placed it on the mouth of a barrel of teruma wine,

and the bread absorbed the smell of the wine,

Rabbi Meir forbids

the bread to non-kohanim, because it absorbed the smell of the wine.

And Rabbi Judah permits.

Rabbi Yose permits with

bread

of wheat, and forbids with

bread

of barley, because the barley absorbs

into itself the smell of the wine.”

Rav Mari analyzed:

Is it not with this that they disagree, that one

[namely, Rabbi Meir]

understands that smell is a substantive matter,

and therefore the bread is forbidden to non-kohanim.

And one

[namely, Rabbi Judah]

understands that smell is nothing at all,

and therefore the bread is permitted.

The Gemara says: Indeed,

according

to

Rava, certainly

it must be said that the question whether smell is a substantive matter or not

is a dispute of tannaim

[dependent upon a dispute of tannaim], and he held like Rabbi Judah, that “smell is not a substantive matter.”

But

according to Abaye, can one say that it is a dispute of tannaim?!

Is it necessary to say that the question depends upon a dispute of tannaim?

But

Abaye could say to you

[Abaye can make the following claim]:

Was it not stated concerning it,

was it not said concerning this Mishna,

“Rabba bar bar Hana said that Reish Lakish said”:

According to everyone, smell is a substantive matter. And therefore,