Avodah Zarah 66b (סו:) — the Talmud in English

And Abaye held that

its aroma is vinegar but its taste is wine—it is vinegar.

Wine whose aroma is like vinegar, even though its taste is like wine, is deemed vinegar.

And

consequently,

it is

considered a mixture of

“like kind with like kind,” and every mixture of “like kind with like kind”

prohibits

even in the smallest amount.

And

Rava,

who

said that the criterion is imparting taste,

held that

if its aroma is vinegar but its taste is wine, it is wine

Wine whose aroma is like vinegar is deemed wine, since its taste is like wine.,

And

consequently

it is

considered a mixture of

“like kind with unlike kind,” and every mixture of “like kind with unlike kind”

prohibits only

when it imparts

taste.

Abaye and Rava also disagreed concerning the following:

This is the case of a bat teiaḥa,

a hole made in the stopper of a barrel, into which a thin reed is inserted, through which the wine is smelled to determine whether it can be preserved,

in which a gentile may smell wine belonging to a Jew, and it is entirely permitted.

That is, a gentile is certainly permitted to smell a Jew’s wine, and the wine does not become prohibited because of the gentile’s smelling it.

However,

a Jew

who smells

the

wine of a gentile:

Abaye said: It is prohibited. Rava said: It is permitted.

The root of their dispute is as follows:

Abaye,

who

said that it is prohibited,

held that

aroma is substantial.

That is, aroma has tangible significance. Consequently, it is prohibited to smell wine of libation.

However,

Rava,

who

said that it is permitted,

held that

aroma is not substantial.

Therefore, there is no prohibition against smelling wine of libation.

Rava said: From where do I say

what is the source for my statement

that aroma is of no consequence?

As we learned

(Terumot, chapter 10, Mishna 4):

“If one heated an oven with cumin

a type of plant whose seeds are used as a spice for stew

of teruma and baked bread in it, the bread is permitted

for consumption by non-priests.

Because there is no cumin taste

in the bread

, but only the aroma of cumin.”

This proves that “aroma is not substantial,” and it is not prohibited to benefit from the aroma of a prohibited substance.

And Abaye

would explain the Mishna in accordance with his position, saying:

“There it is different, because its prohibition is burned.”

That is, since the “cumin” was burned and is no longer present, the bread may not be prohibited because of its aroma.

Rav Mari said:

Apparently, the dispute between Abaye and Rava

is

a dispute between

the tannaim,

as we learned (Terumot, there, Mishna 3):

“One who removes

takes out of the oven

hot bread

of non-sacred produce

, and placed it atop a barrel of wine of teruma,

and the bread absorbed the aroma of the wine,

Rabbi Meir prohibits

the bread to non-priests, because it absorbed the aroma of the wine.

And Rabbi Yehuda permits.

Rabbi Yosei permits

bread

of wheat, but prohibits

bread

of barley, because barley absorbs

the aroma of the wine into itself.”

Rav Mari inferred:

Is it not with regard to this that they disagree, that one

namely, Rabbi Meir

holds that aroma is substantial,

and therefore the bread is prohibited to non-priests?

And the other

namely, Rabbi Yehuda

holds that aroma is of no consequence,

and therefore the bread is permitted.

The Gemara says: Indeed,

according

to

Rava, certainly

one must say that the issue of whether aroma is substantial or not

is a dispute between tannaim,

and he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, that “aroma is not substantial.”

However,

with regard to Abaye, can one say that it is a dispute between tannaim?!

Is it necessary to say that the issue depends on a dispute between tannaim?

But

Abaye could say to you

Abaye can argue as follows:

Was it not stated concerning it

was it not said concerning this Mishna,

“Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Reish Lakish said

that according to everyone, aroma is substantial. And therefore, …