Avodah Zarah 65b (סה:) — the Talmud in English

And indeed,

the father of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika

would pour wine for gentiles, then take them across the ferry, and they would give him barrels as payment.

Rav Ika, Rav Aḥa’s father, sold wine to gentiles and poured it into zikei, meaning leather wineskins that they brought with them. He would ferry them across the river, and they would return to him the wine barrels they had purchased from him as payment for ferrying them across the river.)]

They came and told Abaye.

They asked Abaye whether he was permitted to derive benefit from payment for the wine.

He said to them: When he exerted himself,

when he exerted himself to pour the wine,

he exerted himself in a permitted manner.

Since the wine did not become prohibited until it reached the bottom of the gentile’s wineskin. Therefore, the payment he received for the wine is permitted for benefit.

They said to him:

But he desires its continued existence, so that the wineskins will not burst?

That is, Rav Ika desires the wine to remain intact, so that the wineskins will not burst, requiring the barrels, in which case they would not give the barrels to him.

He said to them: In a situation

where he stipulated with them,

that they would give him the barrels even if the wineskins burst, his payment is permitted. For he does not desire the wine’s continued existence.

Alternatively,

in a situation

where they brought replacement vessels with them,

that is, they brought other vessels in case the wineskins burst, his payment is permitted.

They said to him:

But he takes them across the ferry, and in doing so he exerts himself with regard to a prohibited substance?

When he took them across the river, he exerted himself with regard to yayin nesekh; why, then, is his payment permitted?

He said to them: Rav Ika was the “head of the river,” that is, the person responsible for the ferries on the river, and

it

refers to a situation in which he

spoke to the ferryman beforehand.

He said in advance to the ferryman that he should transport the purchasers of the wine free of charge],

Alternatively, they had knots tied around them,

he gave them a sign by which the ferryman could recognize them and transport them free of charge], and he did not exert himself on their behalf at all. Therefore, his payment is permitted.:

Introduction

Our Mishna discusses the law of yayin nesekh that imparts flavor to a permitted substance: in which cases it renders that substance prohibited for benefit, and in which cases it does not render it prohibited.

The laws governing the prohibition against imparting flavor are divided into four categories:

A.

Flavor that enhances the substance from beginning to end. For example, the flavor of wine in a meat dish; this flavor is certainly prohibited.

B.

Flavor that detracts from the substance from beginning to end, such as the fat of meat, which detracts from honey. This flavor is permitted for benefit even ab initio.

C.

Flavor that initially detracts from the substance but ultimately enhances it, such as the flavor of honey in wine: at first the honey spoils the wine, but after some time it adds an improved aroma and flavor to the wine.

D.

Flavor that initially enhances the substance but ultimately detracts from it, such as the flavor of meat fat in butter. In the latter two categories, the substances are prohibited as a matter of doubt.

Our Mishna explains several circumstances involving the imparting of flavor by yayin nesekh.

Mishna:

If yayin nesekh fell upon grapes

that were attached to the cluster,

, he must rinse them

with water,

and they are permitted

to eat.

Since they absorbed nothing.

And if they were

the grapes

split open,

we are concerned that perhaps they absorbed some of the wine, and

they are prohibited

for benefit.

And similarly, if their stem was removed and they were not attached to the cluster, they are considered pierced, because of the hole at the place of the stem. Tosafot in the name of the Yerushalmi. And likewise if the stem was thin and apt to be removed, it is forbidden. Rabbenu Avraham di Petrutza (Ra'avad). And in the Gemara below (66a) it will be explained whether in a mixture of yayin nesech with grapes it forbids even in some degree without imparting taste, or whether even "like with like" it does not forbid except by imparting taste.

If it fell upon figs or upon dates, and there is in them sufficient flavor

to enhance them,

it is prohibited.

And there was an incident involving Beitossus ben Zonen, who brought dried figs

And there was an incident involving Baitos ben Zunen, who brought dried figs

[dried figs]

on a ship,

and a barrel of yayin nesekh broke and spilled upon them, and he asked the Sages, and they permitted them.

The Gemara will explain that they permitted them because the wine imparted a flavor that detracted from the figs. Our Mishna is incomplete, and this is what it teaches: “And if it imparts a flavor that detracts, it is permitted.” This is evident from the incident involving Baitos ben Zunen, whose dried figs the Sages permitted because the wine imparted a flavor that detracted.

This is the general principle: Anything from whose benefit there is sufficient flavor,

that is, in any case where the prohibited substance imparts an enhancing flavor to the substance upon which it fell, and the person who eats it thereby derives benefit from the prohibited substance,

is prohibited.

And

anything from whose benefit there is not sufficient flavor,

that is, the prohibited substance imparts a detracting flavor to the substance upon which it fell, so that there is no benefit from it,

is permitted.

For he does not derive benefit from the prohibited substance.

For example,

vinegar

of yayin nesekh,

that fell upon groats

and imparted a detracting flavor to them; the groats are permitted.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “If it fell upon figs or upon dates, and there is in them sufficient flavor, it is prohibited. And there was an incident involving Baitos ben Zunen… and he asked the Sages, and they permitted them.”

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

Does the incident contradict the preceding ruling?!

That is, does anyone bring proof that refutes his own statement?!

For at first we learned: “If there is in them sufficient flavor, they are prohibited,” so how could they cite proof from Baitos ben Zunen, whose dried figs the Sages permitted?

The Gemara answers: Our Mishna

is incomplete,

and this is what it teaches: “If it imparts a flavor that detracts, it is permitted. And there was also an incident involving Baitos ben Zunen, who was bringing dried figs on a ship, and a barrel of yayin nesekh broke and spilled upon them, and the incident came before the Sages, and they permitted them.”

Because it imparted a flavor that detracted.

The Gemara cites an incident from which one can derive a ruling concerning the cases mentioned in our Mishna:

There was an incident involving

a certain heap of wheat

[a pile of wheat]

, upon which a barrel of yayin nesekh fell,

in a situation where the wine was sufficient to impart flavor to the wheat.

Rava permitted

[permitted]

selling it

[selling the wheat]

to gentiles.

This requires elucidation, for we hold that a mixture of yayin nesech in wine for wine forbids selling the wine to a gentile, except for the money of the yayin nesech in it, but otherwise all becomes like the object of prohibition and forbidden as benefit. [However, if one cask mixed into many casks, one may sell them all to the gentile except for the value of the forbidden cask, as will be explained in a later sugya.] If so, why did Rava permit to sell the wheat in which yayin nesech was mixed to a gentile? Pri Megadim (in the introduction to the laws of meat and milk) inferred from here that even though we hold that wine in wine is forbidden, nonetheless if yayin nesech mixed into something that is not wine, for example into wheat, even though it imparted taste therein, they are not forbidden as benefit, but they should be sold to the gentile except for the value of the yayin nesech in them. However (in his introduction to the laws of meat and milk) derived from here that although the established ruling is that wine mixed with wine is prohibited, nevertheless, when yayin nesekh becomes mixed with something that is not wine, such as wheat, even if it imparts flavor to it, the mixture is not prohibited for benefit; rather, it may be sold, excluding the value of the yayin nesekh it contains. However, Chasak Shlomo noted, that apparently the Pri Megadim overlooked the statements of the noted that apparently Pri Megadim overlooked the words of Mordechai (Pesachim, ch. "Kol Sha'ah"), who established our sugya in the case of "ordinary vintner," that it is not forbidden as benefit but only for drinking; therefore it would be permitted to sell to the gentile. But in the case of real yayin nesech, certainly it is forbidden to sell to the gentile. (on Pesaḥim, chapter “Kol Sha’a”) apparently escaped the notice of the Pri Megadim. The Mordekhai interpreted our discussion as referring to ordinary wine of gentiles, which is forbidden only for drinking and not for benefit; therefore, it may be sold to a gentile. But actual wine of idolatrous libation is certainly forbidden to be sold to a gentile.

Rabba bar Livai challenged

[he raised a difficulty]

Rava:

We learned in a beraita:

A garment

of wool

in which

a single linen thread was lost, and it is therefore

sha’atnez

and prohibited to wear.

It may not be sold to a gentile, lest the gentile later resell it to a Jew.

And he may not make it into a saddlecloth for a donkey,

lest at a later time he forget and take it from there and sew it into one of his garments.

But he may make it into shrouds for a corpse without relatives.

There is no concern that someone will take it from the dead person’s shrouds, since the garments of the dead are prohibited for benefit. And the dead person himself is no longer subject to the mitzvot, as it is written (Psalms 88:6), “Free among the dead,” and we expound (Nidda 61b): “Once a person dies, he becomes free of the mitzvot.”

This concludes the beraita.

Rabba bar Livai infers:

For what reason may it not

be sold to a gentile?

Because we are concerned

lest he come to sell it

[lest he come to sell it]

to a Jew.

If so, how could Rava permit selling this wheat to a gentile without being concerned

here too,

lest

he come to sell it to a Jew?

He reconsidered,

and as a result of this difficulty Rava reversed his position, and

permitted grinding the wheat, baking it, and selling it to gentiles outside the presence of Jews.

[He permitted grinding the wheat, baking bread from it, and selling it to a gentile outside the presence of Jews.] There is no longer concern that the gentile may resell the bread to a Jew, since gentile bread is prohibited, and they will not purchase it from him.

In any event, it is explained that if wine of libation fell onto wheat, a Jew is forbidden to use it.

This is difficult, for in our Mishna

we learned: If wine of libation fell onto grapes, one must rinse them, and they are permitted.

And if they were split, they are forbidden.

This implies that only if they were

split, yes,

were they rendered forbidden by the wine. But grapes

that are not split are not

rendered forbidden.

If so, why were unsplit wheat kernels rendered forbidden by the wine?

Rav Pappa said: Wheat is different—

its kernels

are considered like split produce, since by virtue of their crease they are deemed split

because they have a crack along their side, and they are rendered forbidden by the wine.