Avodah Zarah 54a (נד.) — the Talmud in English

Ḥizkiya said: What is the verse?,

From where is it derived that an altar consists of many stones, and that its nullification is accomplished by smashing most of it?

The prophet Isaiah said: “Therefore, by this shall the iniquity of Jacob be atoned for...

When he places all the stones of the altar

[made for idol worship]

like chalkstones crushed to pieces; Asherim and sun-images shall not arise

[so that they will not erect Asherah-trees and sun idols for themselves].”

And we derive:

If there are [stones] like chalkstones crushed to pieces,

if indeed they crush them like chalkstone,

Asherim and sun-images shall not arise,

they will not sacrifice upon it.

But if not

they crush them,

they will arise.

And it is thereby demonstrated that the altar is constructed of many stones, and that its nullification is accomplished by smashing them.

We learned above [in the chapter “All the Images”] that anything to which one worshipped and bowed, such as an animal, or such as flour or wine, may not be brought as an offering to God. And even if the gentile nullified that object as an object of idolatry, thereby permitting it for ordinary use, it nevertheless remains prohibited for sacrificial use. And likewise we learned above that since a person cannot prohibit something that is not his, one who bows to another’s animal does not render it prohibited for benefit under the law of ne’evad.

And now the Gemara cites a beraita in which we learned that the object is not prohibited even for sacrificial use.

The tanna taught: An object that was worshipped,

if it is

his—it is

prohibited

for sacrificial use.

But

if it is

another person’s, it is permitted,

because a person cannot prohibit something that is not his.

And we raise a contradiction

from another beraita.

As it was taught:

What is an object that was worshipped?

Anything that people worship, whether unwittingly or intentionally, whether under duress or willingly,

and it is prohibited to bring it as an offering.

And one must analyze:

This “under duress”

mentioned in the beraita—

what are the circumstances?

How was the worship performed under duress?

Is it not

the case of

one who forced another’s animal down and bowed to it?!

And this indicates that the beraita maintains that with regard to the laws of sacrificial use, even an object worshipped by a person who worshipped something that was not his becomes prohibited?

And we answer:

Rami bar Ḥama said: No!

That is not the meaning of the beraita. Rather, the meaning of the “under duress” mentioned in the beraita is

for example, that gentiles forced him, and

the Israelite

bowed to his own animal,

and only in that case does the animal become prohibited.

The novelty of the beraita is that although he was coerced in his worship [as will be explained], the animal nevertheless becomes prohibited as an object that was worshipped. This is on condition that the animal belongs to him; but he cannot prohibit another person’s animal, even when he bows to it willingly.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection against this:

How can the beraita be established as referring to someone who is “under duress” to worship the animal? After all,

“under duress,”

one who is coerced—

the Merciful One exempts him!

The Torah exempts him from every death penalty and every punishment, since he did not commit the transgression willingly and knowingly,

as it is written

[Deuteronomy 22], in the passage concerning the betrothed maiden who was raped:

“But to the maiden you shall do nothing,

there is no sin of death in the maiden; for just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter.”

And from this that the Torah exempted her from punishment, Rabbi Zeira maintains that the Torah thereby revealed that every act performed under duress is considered as though it had not been performed. Therefore, one who bows to an animal under duress is considered not to have worshipped idols at all; consequently, the animal does not become prohibited, and the laws of an object that was worshipped do not apply to it.

And we answer: Since there are circumstances in which he is obligated to surrender his life rather than worship idols, as will be explained, and since he did not surrender his life in that regard, although he will not be punished and is certainly exempt, nevertheless, because he did not surrender his life as he was commanded, he is considered one who worshipped idols, and through his bowing he prohibited the animal.

Rather, Rava said: Everyone,

both one who worships under duress and one who worships willingly,

was included

in what the Torah prohibited:

“You shall not worship them.”

For all the Torah’s mitzvot concerning idolatry were stated in an undifferentiated manner, and the Torah did not distinguish between one who worships willingly and one who is in a situation in which he is forced to worship and will be killed if he does not do so.

But when the verse specified for you

[Leviticus 18]: “You shall observe My statutes and My ordinances, which a person shall do

and live by them,”

and we derive that the observance of the Torah’s mitzvot is intended so that one may live through them,

and not die through them—

duress is excluded

from the obligation to observe the mitzvot, so that he should not “die through them.” If so, seemingly, he may worship idols under duress in order not to be killed.

But

on the other hand,

the Merciful One again wrote

[there, Leviticus 22]:

“And you shall not profane My holy Name,

but I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel.” The verse teaches

that even under duress

he is not permitted to transgress in a matter that entails the profanation of God’s Name, such as worshipping idols.

How then?

How do we reconcile the contradiction between the two verses, one of which says that he is not obligated to surrender his life, while the other says that he is obligated to surrender his life?

This

verse from which we derive that he is not obligated speaks of a transgression performed

in private,

where there is no profanation of God’s Name.

And that

verse which says that he is obligated speaks of a transgression performed

in public,

in the presence of ten Israelites. If he does so, even under duress, he profanes God’s Name [as it says there: “but I shall be sanctified among the children of Israel”].

Nevertheless, although he is obligated to surrender himself in public rather than worship, if he does worship, he incurs no punishment at all. It is with regard to this case that the beraita says that the animal becomes prohibited: since he worshipped it, the animal acquires the status of an object that was worshipped, and because of that status it is prohibited for sacrificial use.

The Sages said to Rava: It was taught

in a beraita

that supports you,

supporting your view that such worship gives the object the status of an object that was worshipped, despite the fact that he was coerced.

As it was taught:

The platforms of the gentiles

[upon which they constantly place idols, and not only when the king passes by; and they are prohibited as accessories of idolatry],

during a time of persecution,

the persecution decreed by the gentiles against Israel to worship idols,

even though the decree was annulled, those platforms were not nullified,

and they remained prohibited for benefit.

The time of the decree is a time of persecution, whose law is that of public worship, and at that time one is obligated to surrender one’s life. It is therefore demonstrated from the beraita, in accordance with Rava, that the platforms remain prohibited despite the fact that the idols were worshipped under duress.

Rava said to them,

to the Sages:

If it is because of this,

if your proof is from this beraita—

it does not support you;

do not bring me support from it, for it provides no proof. It is possible that the platforms are prohibited for the following reason:

Say

that we are concerned that among all the Jews against whom the decree was issued

there was an apostate Israelite

[another version:

an apostate]

there,

among them,

and

he indeed

worshipped it

and served it

willingly.

And it was because of him that those platforms became prohibited.

Rav Ashi said: Do not say,

you need not say:

“Say”,

that this is merely a concern, lest there have been an apostate among them.

Rather, certainly an apostate Israelite was there

among them,

and he worshipped it willingly.

For when he saw Israel’s power waning, and that they were in a state of lowliness and submission, his heart inclined toward idolatry.

Thus far, the Gemara has explained the beraita according to the explanation of Rami bar Ḥama, that it concerns one whom they forced to bow to his own animal.

The Gemara now presents another answer: The beraita does indeed concern one whom the gentiles did not force, but who forced down another person’s animal. Nevertheless, this is not a contradiction to the other beraita, in which we learned that a person cannot prohibit something that is not his. That principle applies when he merely bows to it and performs no act upon the body of another person’s animal. But if he performs an act upon another person’s animal, he prohibits it despite the fact that it is not his; and it is in such a case that the beraita said: “whether under duress.”

Ḥizkiya said: For example, that he poured wine for idolatry upon

[the version of the Baḥ:

between]

its horns.

And we object:

Rav Adda bar Ahava raised an objection against this:

Although it is true that a person can prohibit something that is not his through an act, nevertheless, Ḥizkiya’s answer is not satisfactory. For is

this an object that was worshipped?!

If one pours wine for idolatry between the animal’s horns, while the animal itself is not an idol, does the animal thereby become an object that was worshipped? The animal was not worshipped! Rather,

this,

this situation,

is merely a platform, and it is permitted

[the version of the Baḥ:

that they made it];

the animal merely serves as a “platform” for idolatry, and living animals do not become prohibited as “accessories of idolatry” .

And we answer:

Rather, Rav Adda bar Ahava said:

Indeed, the case concerns one who worshipped the animal itself,

for example, that he poured wine between its horns,

thereby making it an idol; and since

he performed an act upon it,

it becomes prohibited despite the fact that it belongs to another person.

It is in this manner that the second beraita prohibited the animal. But when he did not perform an act upon it—for example, when he bowed to it or performed another service for it that does not involve its body—it does not become prohibited, because it is not his.

The Gemara now proceeds to explain the statement that a person can prohibit something that is not his through an act.

And is this

like the statement

that Ulla came

when he arrived from Eretz Yisrael:

He said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan: Although they said,

the Sages,

that one who bows to another’s animal does not prohibit it,

nevertheless, if he

performs an act upon it—

he prohibits it.

Rav Naḥman said to them,

to his colleagues:

Go out

and leave

and tell Ulla: Rav Huna has already explained your statement,

here

in Babylonia.

For Rav Huna said: If another person’s animal was lying

of its own accord

before an idol, once

he slaughtered one of its identifying signs,

the windpipe or the gullet, for idolatry—

he prohibits it,

even though it is not his.

And we explain:

From where do we know

that

he prohibits it

through the performance of an act?

If you say

that we should derive it

from

the fact that the

kohanim

were prohibited—when the kings of Israel forced them to become priests for idolatry—and were thereby prohibited, as the prophet Ezekiel said [44]: “And they shall not draw near to Me, to serve as priests to Me,” since they performed an act, despite the fact that the kohanim are not considered the property of the kings —

And we challenge: What is the proof?

And perhaps

it is possible to say:

The kohanim,

who are members of the family designated to serve in the Temple, were therefore prohibited

because they are people capable of understanding,

and they should have risked their lives rather than worship idols. Therefore, the Sages penalized them. But how can one derive from this that an animal is prohibited even when it was used for idolatry by someone who was not its owner?

Rather,

if you wish to derive that an object becomes prohibited through an act,

from the stones of the altar,

which are not capable of understanding, and which the Hasmonean kings concealed because the Greek kings rendered them repulsive by using them for idolatry, as we learned earlier (52b), then although the Greek kings could not have prohibited them, since they did not belong to them, nevertheless, because an act had been performed with them, the Sages of that generation prohibited them and concealed them.

And we challenge: What is the proof?

And perhaps, as

said

Rav Pappa

there: They found a verse, that is, they found proof from the verse that states (Ezekiel 7): “And marauders shall enter it and profane it.” Since marauders entered the Sanctuary and defiled it, they rendered all its vessels non-sacred, and the gentiles acquired them because they had become ownerless; thus they were no longer “an object that does not belong to him.”