Avodah Zarah 12a (יב.) — the Talmud in English

He said to him

Rabbi Ḥanina:

Have you never gone to

the city of

Tyre

(a mixed city—in which Jews and gentiles lived)

in your life, and

have you never

seen a Jew and an idolater

who placed two pots on one stove !(pamud.bmp "

precise page location")

with their mouths facing one another,

adjacent to each other, one containing unslaughtered carcass meat and the other containing slaughtered meat,

and the Sages did not concern themselves

did not worry

about them,

as will be explained. So too, in the case of the market of Gaza, although it is very close to the inhabitants of the city who have a festival day, the Sages did not concern themselves, and it is permitted to engage in business with them. And Rabbi Ḥanina did not say “it is permitted”; rather, he merely presented a “parable” from the city of Sidon, in order to derive from it the case of the market of Gaza.

And the Gemara explains:

What is the meaning of “the Sages did not concern themselves about them”?

What is the parable, and what is its subject, and what concern should the Sages have had regarding the two pots but did not have, and what does this come to teach us?

The amora’im disagreed with regard to this:

Abaye said: It is with regard to unslaughtered carcass meat.

That is,

we do not say

the Sages did not concern themselves

lest the Jew turn his face away,

perhaps the Jew will turn his gaze backward and fail to pay attention to his pot,

and

in the meantime

the

he will throw

idolater

meat

of an unslaughtered carcass into the pot

of the Jew that was placed over the fire next to the gentile’s pot.

So too here,

and similarly in the case of the market of Gaza,

the Sages did not concern themselves on account of the money of idolatry.

That is, Abaye maintains that Rabbi Ḥanina came to be lenient and to say that even where there is a possibility that one might violate the Torah prohibition of “the money of [funds from] idolatry” [see the note], which is a matter prohibited by the Torah, nevertheless they did not concern themselves with it.

The prohibition of the money of idolatry is on account of the verse [Deuteronomy 13]: “and nothing whatsoever of the doomed property shall cleave to your hand.” And although it is possible that money of idolatry belonging to the people of Gaza is present in the livestock market, since today is their festival day, and when a Jew sells an animal in the market to a gentile it is possible that he receives prohibited money in exchange, nevertheless the Sages did not concern themselves about this.

The reason is that there is no money in the market that is certainly known to be money of idolatry; there is only uncertainty in the matter. Therefore, we do not presume that ordinary money is prohibited by saying that perhaps it is money of a prohibition. Rather, we are lenient and say that presumably it is not prohibited money. This is analogous to the fact that the Sages did not concern themselves in Sidon with the case of the two pots, since there too, ostensibly, there is concern lest the gentile place unslaughtered carcass meat into the Jew’s pot , thereby rendering the Jew’s meat prohibited by a Torah prohibition. But the Sages did not presume a prohibition on the basis of uncertainty, until it becomes known to you that there is a prohibition here.

This is the comparison between Sidon and the market of Gaza.

According to Abaye, since we are not concerned even with the possibility of a Torah prohibition, all the more so are we not concerned with the possibility of a rabbinic prohibition: perhaps the gentile who purchases animals outside the city of Gaza belongs to the inhabitants of the city, and today is his festival day. It follows that the Jew who sells him an animal violates a rabbinic prohibition, as the Sages prohibited engaging in business with them.

Rava said: What is the meaning

of Rabbi Ḥanina’s words

“the Sages did not concern themselves about them”?

They did not concern themselves

on account of the cooking of idolaters.

Similarly,

in the same way,

so too

in the market of Gaza,

the Sages did not concern themselves on account of

the possibility that the gentile purchaser belongs to the inhabitants of the city, and today is

their festival day.

It is implied by Rava’s words that Rabbi Ḥanina permitted selling an animal outside the city even on the actual day of their festival.

That is, Rava disagrees with Abaye and maintains that the Sages were not so lenient. The fact that they did not concern themselves lest the gentile place unslaughtered carcass meat into the Jew’s pot was not because the Sages did not presume a prohibition in the case of a possible Torah prohibition. Rather, it was because the gentile is not presumed likely to do this, since he fears the Jew: if the Jew were to discover it, he would bring him to court.

Rava maintains that if there is in fact a possible Torah prohibition, we are concerned about it. Therefore, according to him, ordinary coins found in the market are prohibited. It is permitted to accept money from the people in the market, those from outside the city, only when they paid from their own box, in which case there is no concern that it is “money of idolatry.”

Rather, Rabbi Ḥanina came to permit selling an animal to livestock merchants outside the city even though there is concern that this particular gentile may belong to the inhabitants of the city, and now it is “his festival day.” When the Jew sells him an animal, he violates a rabbinic prohibition, since the Sages prohibited engaging in business with them.

The reason for the leniency is that this is a possible rabbinic prohibition, and the Sages did not concern themselves with this, just as they did not concern themselves lest the Jew rely on the gentile, and the gentile stir the coals beneath the pots, causing the Jew to violate the prohibition of “the cooking of gentiles,” which is a rabbinic prohibition.

Rabba bar Ulla disagrees with this and maintains that it is prohibited. Indeed, there is concern that the gentile belongs to the inhabitants of the city.

And from the fact that in Sidon there is no concern regarding the prohibition of the cooking of idolatry, no proof can be brought that there is no concern with regard to any rabbinic prohibition. The reason is that even if the gentile stirs the coals, it is still possible that the food will not become prohibited on account of the cooking of idolatry, if the Jew also stirs the coals [as explained in its place], and the Jew will in fact do so —

But in the market of Gaza Rabbi Ḥanina did not permit this. Indeed, he is concerned about the prohibition of engaging in business with those from outside it, lest they belong to the inhabitants of the city, since it is adjacent to it [and as for the Mishna’s permission, it is speaking of a place that is not so close, such as the distance between the market of Gaza and the city of Gaza]—

Rather, Rabbi Ḥanina permitted this only on the days before their festival, whose prohibition is a lenient prohibition relative to the actual day of their festival. This is analogous to the fact that there is no need to be concerned lest the gentile’s food spill over the rim of the pot and drip into the Jew’s pot. The reason the Sages did not concern themselves is that this is not common; moreover, even if it occurs, the drops will be nullified in a ratio of one to sixty in the Jew’s pot.

And Rabbi Ḥanina indeed prohibited the case of the market of Gaza, permitting it only when it was farther away from it, so that the concern was diminished—and then he permitted it.

Rabba bar Ulla said:

just as

the Sages did not concern themselves

with

the people of Sidon

on account of a spurt

lest some liquid drip from the gentile’s pot into the Jew’s pot—

Similarly,

in this comparison,

so too, the Sages did not concern themselves about them on account of “the days before their festival.”

But on their festival days, it is prohibited to sell an animal to a gentile in the market of Gaza.

According to Rabba bar Ulla’s explanation, this ikka de-amrei disagrees with the preceding ikka de-amrei and prohibits the case of the market of Gaza on their festival days.

We learned in our Mishna:

What is the law with regard to going there? When the road is designated exclusively for that place—

it is prohibited; but if one could travel on it to another place—

it is permitted.

Our Mishna was taught anonymously, without dispute, whereas in a beraita the Sages disagreed about the matter. And so we learned:

The Sages taught: With regard to a city in which there is idolatry,

and today is their festival day,

it is prohibited to enter it, and one may not

pass

through it to another city.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Sages say: Whenever the road is designated exclusively for that place—

it is prohibited. If the road is not designated exclusively for that place,

but there is passage through it to another place—

it is permitted.

The beraita continues with matters that are prohibited on account of suspicion of idolatry.

If

a thorn became lodged

in his foot while he was passing

before an idol—

he may not bend down

to stoop

and remove it,

the thorn,

because he appears to be bowing to the idol.

But if he does not appear—

it is permitted,

as will be explained below.

Similarly, if

his coins became scattered before an idol—

he may not bend down and pick them up, because he appears to be bowing to the idol. But if he does not appear—

it is permitted.

Similarly,

a spring that flows

water

before an idol—

he may not bend down and drink, because he appears to be bowing to the idol. But if he does not appear—

it is permitted.

Statues,

sculptures of human faces, with a hollow inside them through which water flows from the mouths of the statues [that is, water fountains fashioned in the shape of human faces]

that pour water for the cities

Rashi’s version:

in the cities,

in large towns they did this as a prestigious practice]—

he may not place his mouth on their mouths and drink, because he appears to be kissing an idol.

Similarly, he may not place his mouth on a water pipe,

a water pipe fixed to the ground,

and drink

directly from the stream of water, before the water enters a vessel in which he could see whether it is clean,

because of the danger,

lest he swallow a leech.

And now the Gemara explains the beraita:

What

is the meaning of “and if”

“he does not appear”?

It is permitted?

If you say,

if we say

that he is not visible,

that he does this when no one sees him, it is difficult: How could they have permitted it?!

But didn’t Rav Yehuda say that Rav said: Wherever the Sages prohibited

something that is permitted, and prohibited it

because of appearance,

so that an observer would not suspect him of violating a prohibition—

even in the innermost rooms,

where no one sees him,

it is prohibited

for him to do it. And it is impossible to interpret the beraita in this manner.

Rather, say: If he does not appear to be bowing to the idol,

because he turns himself away from the idols, backward or to the side,

it is permitted.

And the Gemara adds in explanation of the beraita:

And it is necessary,

the beraita needed to state several forms of suspicion.

For if the tanna had taught the case of a thorn,

if the tanna had taught us only the law of a thorn, we would say that it is prohibited only in this circumstance,

because

he need not remove it specifically in front of an idol;

it is possible

for him

to walk past it,

to continue on his way until he is farther from the idol,

and remove it,

there. Therefore, it is prohibited to remove it here, because he appears to be lingering for the purpose of bowing.

But coins,

that became scattered opposite the idols,

it is not possible

for him to move away; rather, he must gather them here, and he appears to be gathering his money, not bowing.

I would say that it is not

prohibited for him to bend down and gather them. Therefore, the tanna needs to teach us that it is prohibited.

And if he had taught only the case of coins,

if the tanna had taught us only the law of coins, we would say that it is prohibited only in that case,

because it involves monetary loss,

as he suffers only financial loss if he does not gather them.

But a thorn, which involves pain,

as he suffers bodily pain,

I would say that it is not

prohibited for him. Therefore, the tanna teaches us in the beraita that nevertheless it is prohibited.

And if he had taught these two cases,

only a thorn and coins, we would say that they are prohibited only

because there is no danger,

since if he does not remove the thorn or gather the coins, he is not endangered.

But a spring, where there is danger,

as he is endangered,

for if he does not drink,

if he does not drink,

he may die,

he may die of thirst —

I would say that it is not

prohibited for him to drink. The tanna therefore teaches us in the beraita that, nevertheless, he may not drink from the spring.

It is necessary!

Therefore, the beraita needed to teach all these cases .