Arakhin 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

It is stated in the portion of Bechukotai: " When a person explicitly makes a vow, according to the valuation of souls to Hashem. " And your valuation of the male shall be from twenty years old to sixty years old, and your valuation shall be fifty silver shekels, according to the sacred shekel." There are two forms of one who vows to donate to the Temple the monetary value of a person. The first is to obligate himself by vow to the Temple for the person's value, according to what that person would be worth if sold in the marketplace as a slave [Hebrew or a Canaanite slave, as will be explained]. The second is to obligate himself for a person's “valuation,” according to the value fixed for him by the Torah in the portion concerning valuations. One who vows to donate to the Temple the “monetary value of a person” has made an ordinary vow of monetary value to the Temple. But one who obligates himself for his “valuation” obligates himself under the law of one who makes an assessment, according to the special rules stated in the portion concerning valuations. Mishna:

a.

Everyone—

takes part in valuations,

meaning that they obligate themselves for the valuation of a particular person as explained in the portion concerning valuations, each person according to his valuation and in accordance with his age.

And

everyone

is subject to valuation,

for every person has a “valuation” and can obligate himself for the valuation stated by the Torah, or another person can obligate himself for his valuation by saying, “The valuation of so-and-so is upon me.”

b. Everyone

can vow

the monetary value of a particular person upon himself for the Temple, and is obligated to pay his value according to his market price as a slave.

And

everyone

can be the subject of a vow,

since anyone can say concerning himself, “My monetary value is upon me,” and another person can likewise obligate himself by vow for his monetary value, by saying, “The monetary value of so-and-so is upon me.”

This includes—

kohanim, Levites, and Israelites; women and slaves 4 ,

who will pay after they are divorced or freed.

c.

A tumtum 7 , [a person whose sex is uncertain because the place of the male organ is covered by a membrane],

who has both male and female sexual organs, are

and an androgynos,

who possesses both male and female organs,

can make vows and be the subject of vows,

because they have monetary value and can be sold in the marketplace as slaves. Similarly, a tumtum and an androgynos

can make valuations,

for they can say, “The valuation of a particular person is upon me [who is neither a tumtum nor an androgynos],” and obligate themselves to the Temple for that person's valuation as stated by the Torah. But they

are not subject to valuation,

because the Torah did not assign them a valuation: male and female are stated in the portion, thereby excluding a tumtum and an androgynos. Therefore, if they say, “My valuation is upon me,” or others say concerning them, “The valuation of so-and-so [who is a tumtum or an androgynos] is upon me,” they are not obligated at all,

for only one who is certainly male or certainly female is subject to valuation!

d.

A deaf-mute,

and are subject to valuation

an imbecile, and a minor can be the subject of vows,

since they have monetary value and can be sold in the marketplace as slaves,

and are subject to valuations

according to the values fixed for them by the Torah.

But

a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor

cannot make vows or make valuations—

because they lack understanding,

and one must be an adult who knows how

to distinguish,

to understand for whom he is making the vow or valuation [Rabbeinu Gershom].

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna:

Everyone takes part in valuations!

And we raise a difficulty: “Everyone”—

what

does this come to include?

And we answer:

It comes to include

a minor who has reached the age of twelve and knows for whom vows and dedications are made, who is called

mufla

[one who knows and understands how to distinguish],

near

[the age of thirteen, when he becomes]

a man!

He too can make valuations .

We further raise a difficulty: The statement that “everyone”

is subject to valuation—the word “everyone” at the beginning of the Mishna also applies to those subject to valuation—

what

does this come to include?

And we answer:

It comes to include

one who is

repulsive or afflicted with boils,

who, although they have no monetary value and cannot be sold in the marketplace, do have a valuation fixed by the Torah.

For

it might have entered our minds

that since “When a person explicitly makes a

vow according to your valuation” is written, the verse equates vows with valuations, and we might have said that only

what does this come to include? If it comes to include a tumtum and an androgynos,

everyone

who

has a monetary value,

for whom one can undertake an obligation based on his monetary value,

has a valuation,

for whom one can undertake an obligation based on his valuation,

whereas anyone who does not have a monetary value,

such as one who is repulsive or afflicted with boils, who has no value for sale in the marketplace,

does not have a valuation,

and even if they undertake an obligation based on their valuations, the obligation would not take effect.

It teaches us

what is stated afterward: “According to your valuation of

souls,”

that

any

soul can be the subject of an obligation based on its valuation, even if it has no monetary value for sale in the marketplace.

We further raise a difficulty: Regarding what is written, “Everyone

can make vows”—

what does this come to include?

And we answer: “Everyone

can be the subject of vows”

was necessary to state, and since it was stated there, “everyone can make vows” was also written at the beginning.

Since we have explained what the word “everyone” comes to include, we also explain what “everyone” means in other places in the Mishnayot.

And we explain: “Everyone

can be the subject of vows”—

if it comes to include a tumtum and an androgynos,

for one can undertake an obligation for their monetary values even though one cannot undertake an obligation for their valuations, was this not

explicitly taught

in the Mishna, which states that they can be the subject of vows?!

And if it comes to include a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor,

that they can be the subject of vows, this too was

explicitly taught in the Mishna!?

If it comes to include

the possibility of undertaking an obligation for the monetary value of an infant who is

less than one month old—

this too was

explicitly taught

later in the Mishna, which states that he can be the subject of a vow but is not subject to valuation?!

And if it comes to include a gentile,

who, although he is not subject to valuation according to Rabbi Yehuda, can be the subject of a vow, this too was

explicitly taught in the Mishna!?

And we answer: Rather,

indeed, it comes to include one who is less than one month old,

who, although he has no valuation, has monetary value and can be sold in the marketplace. Although this is explicitly stated in the following Mishna, this is the tanna's method:

He first teaches it, and afterward explains it!

The same approach can also be used to explain the reference to a gentile or to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor. [See Rashi for another explanation!] .

Once we have explained what the word “everyone” comes to include, we also explain what “everyone” means in other places in the Mishnayot.

Everyone lays hands

on the sacrifice—“

everyone,”

what does this come to include?

It comes to include an heir,

who lays hands on a sacrifice that his father designated,

and not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds in the following beraita that an heir does not lay hands on the sacrifice.

Everyone can substitute

a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal—

what does this come to include?

It comes to include

an heir who substitutes a non-sacred animal for a sacrifice designated by his father,

and not in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda!

As it was taught in a beraita: An heir

of a sacrifice

lays hands

on it, and likewise, an

heir

of a sacrifice

can perform substitution.

Rabbi Yehuda says: An heir does not lay hands, and an heir cannot perform substitution!

And we raise a difficulty:

What is Rabbi Yehuda's reason?

And we answer: The word

“his offering”

is written three times in the verse concerning laying hands, and Rabbi Yehuda derives from one of them:

“His offering,” and not his father's offering! And he derives

the law of substitution, which is

the beginning of consecration,

meaning that when one seeks to substitute one animal for another and confer the sanctity of the sacrifice of substitution upon the non-sacred animal, this is the beginning of consecration for the non-sacred animal, and Rabbi Yehuda derives this

from

the law of laying hands, which is

the end of consecration [since it takes place immediately before slaughter]—

b.

just as

laying hands, which is the

end

of consecration,

an heir does not lay hands, so too

substitution, which is the

beginning of consecration, an heir cannot perform substitution!

And the Rabbis,

who hold that an heir can perform substitution, derive from what is written,

“He shall surely substitute”—

to include an heir!

And according to them,

we derive

the opposite: the law of

laying hands, which is

so that if several partners bring an offering jointly, they must all rest their hands on it. It is not sufficient for one of them to rest his hands on behalf of all of them.

the end of consecration,

immediately before slaughter, is derived

from

the law of substitution, which is

the beginning of consecration

of the sacrifice—

just as an heir can perform substitution at the beginning of consecration,

as the Rabbis derive from “He shall surely substitute,”

so too an heir lays hands at the end of consecration!

And we raise a difficulty:

And according to the Rabbis,

who hold that an heir lays hands,

what do they do with this “his offering”

written concerning laying hands, from which Rabbi Yehuda excludes an heir from laying hands—

what do they derive from it?

And we answer: According to the Rabbis,

they require it

for the three verses “his offering,” for the following homiletic interpretations:

a.

“His offering”—

and not a gentile's offering,

as a gentile's offering is excluded from the requirement of laying hands [see Tosafot, who explain that the exclusion is from the laying on of hands by a koh].

b.

“His offering”—

and not another person's offering!

No one lays hands on a sacrifice that is not his own.

c.

“His offering”—

to include all partners in laying hands,

so that if several partners bring a sacrifice—all the partners must lay hands on it. It is not sufficient for one of them to lay hands on behalf of them all.

And now we ask:

And Rabbi Judah,

who derives from “his offering” that an offering brought by an heir is excluded from semikha—from where does he derive the three derivations that the Rabbis expounded?

And we answer: What the Rabbis derived from “his offering”

to include all joint owners in semikha—

he does not hold of it!

Rather, Rabbi Judah maintains that one of the partners performs semikha on behalf of them all.

Alternatively, he does hold of

this derivation, like the Rabbis, and one instance of “his offering” is nevertheless superfluous, enabling him to derive from it that an heir does not perform semikha.